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A commentary on
Advancing understanding of executive function impairments and psychopathology: bridging
the gap between clinical and cognitive approaches
by Snyder, H. R., Miyake, A., and Hankin, B. L. (2015). Front. Psychol. 6:328. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00328
My comments on Snyder et al. (2015) are not targeting any particular statement contained in
their review; instead they aim to highlight some overarching epistemological issues that are tacitly
contained in their work and suggest an alternative standpoint.
Although a widespread mantra uttered by the majority of executive function (EF) scholars since
Teuber (1972), claim the unity and diversity of the concept of EF, the search for an integrated
account of the nature of EF has been as elusive as the search for its definition (Goldstein and
Naglieri, 2013; Wasserman and Wasserman, 2013). These endeavors are intimately connected. A
“conceptual analysis” (Deitz and Arrington, 1984; Ryle, 2009) should suffice to acknowledge the
interdependence of both pursuits. Nevertheless only a few scholars have undertaken the task of
assessing the epistemological grounds of EF research (Dick and Overton, 2009; Martin and Failows,
2009; Armengol de la Miyar and Moes, 2014).
To begin with, the history of the concept of EF can be seen as an instructive example of the
paradoxical effects prompted by the “incommensurability” of scientific “paradigms” when looking
at the same subject matter (Kuhn, 2012). In particular, the translation of theoretical notions from
one paradigm to another, without assimilating the “thought style” that gave origin to them could
lead to severe conceptual entanglements and disorientation (Mößner, 2011; Fleck, 2012).
The debut of a mature concept of EF was staged in Soviet dialectical materialism, migrating
from there, but ill-defined, to the Anglo-Saxon cognitivist paradigm. Under this paradigm, the
notion of EF was detached from its original sources i.e., (Anokhin and Bernstein’s functional system
theory, Vygotsky and Luria’s cultural-historical approach and Filimonov’s principle of “graded
and pluripotential localization of functions”) (Luria, 2012), losing its integrative character and
transplanted to a modular and computational view of cognition (Fodor, 1983; Newell, 1994).
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In this framework, cognitive functions appear like faculties,
underpinned by a modular neural substrate in which the
postulated EF come into sight in a more or less stable
correspondence with distinct brain networks in which one is
the seat of an homuncular central control (Uttal, 2001). This
conceptual shift has favored multiple, ad-hoc, arbitrary extension
to the concept of EF, with poor or null operational character
without reaching consensus (Barkley, 2012). As a consequence
the methodological aspect and the experimental expression of EF
models are downgraded in their validity and utility.
My suggestion, to restore the integrative nature of EF, is
to re-connect the concept with its overlooked origins and
complement them with like theories, for example: Piaget’s
Constructivism, Dynamical System approach to cognition and
contemporary Anticipatory Systems Theory. In this way it
might be possible to provide a renovated framework to get an
intensional definition of EF, that could begin to bridge “the
gap between clinical and cognitive approaches” (Snyder et al.,
2015). To substantiate my suggestion, I would like to summarize
some key notions taken from our particular translational research
programme.
Routinely EF is seen as a wide set of neurocognitive processes
and abilities which more or less includes (Chan et al., 2008; Vohs
and Baumeister, 2011; Barkley, 2012; Goldstein and Naglieri,
2013):
• Reasoning and problem-solving.
• Anticipating, planning and decision-making.
• The ability to sustain attention and resistance to interference.
• Utilization of feed-forward, feedback and multitasking.
• Cognitive flexibility and the ability to deal with novelty.
Noteworthy is that every aspect that has been mentioned in the
recent reviewed literature as being fundamental features of EF,
can be associated with the main stages of a “functional systems”
(FS) operation as it was devised by Anokhin (1974). Accordingly I
have introduced an intensional definition of EF (Labra-Spröhnle,
2015, 2016); paraphrasing Anokhin (1974): EF are any of “those
specific mechanisms of the functional system which provide for
the universal physiological architecture of the behavioral act.”
The advantage of this definition is that it coordinates all of
those mechanisms with a systemic framework, giving unity and
diversity to the concept of EF. The series of operational stages of
a FS can be outlined as follows:
1. “Preparation for decision-making (afferent synthesis),
2. Decision making (selection of an action),
3. Prognosis of the action result (generation of acceptor of action
result),
4. Generation of the action program (efferent synthesis),
5. Performance of an action,
6. Attainment of the result,
7. Backward afferentation (feedback) to the central nervous
system about parameters of the result,
8. Comparison between the result of action and the prognosis”
(Anokhin, 1974).
Moreover the inferential processes that drive cognitive processes
extend beyond being mere connections between predicates and
were defined by Peirce (1901) and Piaget et al. (2013) comprising
three kinds of inferences working in a cycle:
1. Abduction, or hypothesis creation; this is a kind of guess
regarding the configurations and possible reactions from the
environment.
2. Deduction, allows predictions (logical consequences derived
from the former guess or hypothesis), regarding the
configurations and reactions from the environment.
3. Induction, assess the result of the actions carried out by the
agent by comparing the predictions with the actual results.
An isomorphic functional architecture was experimentally
discovered by Anokhin (1974) and Bernstein (1967), in various
physiologic processes and goal-directed behaviors, showing the
ubiquitous character of these processes in living organisms. The
core of operations of a FS are equivalent to the inferential cycle
described by Peirce and Piaget. Based on this mapping and in
the proposed definition of EF, it can be postulated that inferences
are at the core of EF, playing the elusive role of the “executive”;
forming an integrative, distributed and hierarchical control with
the cognitive functions at the top.
Methodologically, the inferential dynamics can be rendered
using diagrams (Labra Sprohnle et al., 1997). The further
description of these diagrams can be accomplished using
morphological descriptors, i.e., Euclidean and non-Euclidean
geometric measures. By these means the EF modeling is
achieved by using a multivariate set of geometrical measures and
supervised machine learning techniques (Labra-Spröhnle, 2015,
2016).
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